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CASE COMMENTS
supra, represents the better view. 1A BARON & HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL
PRAcrcE & PNocmDunr 11 370 (1960).
Second, where the nonresident defendant has already made a
motion, but before his answer, the resident defendant is dismissed,
it seems that the nonresident defendant should be able to challenge
venue by either motion or answer. A waiver of defenses only
occurs if the defendant fails to raise a defense "then available" to
him. W. VA. R.C.P. 12(g) & (h). For this reason it would appear
that the nonresident defendant would not waive any defense not
available to him at the time he made his motion. In Frank v.
Broumell, 149 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1957), defendant's failure to
object to venue was not a waiver where the complaint was insuf-
ficient to put the defendant on notice of an issue upon which an
objection to venue could be made.
In the third and fourth situations which occur after the answer
and either before or during the trial, the basic question is how
soon the nonresident defendant must raise the objection to venue
after the dismissal of the resident defendant before the right to
object is waived. In the light of the Harley case, supra, in which
waiver occurred when the nonresident defendant filed an additional
pleading, it would appear that any affirmative action by the non-
resident defendant, other than an objection to venue, might con-
stitute a waiver of the right to object to venue. This would in-
dicate that an objection to venue should be made immediately after
the dismissal of the resident defendant regardless of the stage of
the proceedings and before any other action is taken.
Frank Thomas Graft, Jr.
Sales--Notice Filing Under Uniform Commercial Code
D loaned money to A, a restauranteur, who by a security agree-
ment, conveyed the contents of his restaurant and all after-acquired
property to D, who filed a financing statement in accordance with
the Uniform Commercial Code. P then entered into a conditional
sale contract with A for the sale of a cash register, delivered the
chattel to A, but failed to file a financing statement within the
ten-day grace period specified by the Uniform Commercial Code.
A subsequently defaulted on both obligations. D sold the cash
register. P brought an action of tort for conversion. The trial court
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entered judgment for P. The Appellate Division affirmed on the
omission of reference to after-acquired property in the D's financing
statement. Held, reversed. The requirements of notice filing are
met without a detailed disclosure of the security agreement. Na-
tional Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., 191 N.E.2d 471 (Mass.
1963).
Had this case been litigated in West Virginia under present law,
the result probably would have been the same. An unrecorded
conditional sale contract is no protection from a prior creditor
holding a chattel mortgage containing an after-acquired property
clause. W. VA. CoDE ch. 40, art. 3, § 5 (Michie 1961); Triumph
Elec. Co. v. Empire Furniture Co., 70 W. Va. 164, 73 S.E. 325
(1911).
West Virginia is one of twenty-eight states to have adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code. It has been enacted as Chapter
forty-six of the West Virginia Code and becomes effective July
1, 1964.
One of the major changes in West Virginia law occasioned by
the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code is the system of
recordation. Presently West Virginia operates under a detailed
filing system which demands a sometimes painfully complete
description of chattel, realty or financial agreements. The system
is the source of much litigation. With the number of "credit pur-
chases" increasing each day, the physical bulk of these documents
could be a problem in the foreseeable future.
As of July 1, 1964, the theory that a recorded security agree-
ment provides notice to the world of the creditor's rights, Banks-
Miller Supply Co. v. Bank of Marlinton, 106 W. Va. 583, 146 S.E.
521 (1929), will be supplemented by the system of "notice filing."
Notice filing is basically much simpler than our present system.
It does not purport to provide notice of anything more than an
outstanding security interest. Once filed, a financing statement
provides constructive notice to the world that the creditor may
have a security interest in the collateral described. UNFOiRM Com-
mmcrL CODE § 9-402, Comment 2.
Under present law, the responsibility is upon the creditor to
record the contract entered into with the debtor, and, as there is
no statutory provision for the description of the security, the creditor
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must be as precise as possible. Annotation to W. VA. CODE ch. 40,
art. 3, § 6 (Michie 1961).
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, one may file the con-
tract or a financing statement. The financing statement need only
contain the address of the secured party from whom information
concerning the security interest can be obtained, the mailing ad-
dress of the debtor, the signatures of the parties, and a statement
indicating the types or items of collateral. W. VA. CODE ch. 46,
art. 9, § 402(1) (Michie Supp. 1963). A statutory form is pro-
vided. W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art 9, § 402(3) (Michie Supp. 1963).
The actual filing takes place in the office of the clerk of the
county court, or in the secretary of state's office, and in some in-
stances both. W. VA. CODE ch, 46, art 9, § 401 (Michie Supp.
1963).
If the intent of the American Law Institute be followed, the
present strict construction of descriptions, Sturgill v. Lovell Lumber
Co., 136 W. Va. 259, 265-66, 67 S.E.2d 321 (1951), will be abol-
ished. UN IFoOmv CoMnvECrAL. CODE § 9-110, Comment. Under the
new provisions, "... . any description of personal property or real
estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably
identifies what is described." W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 9, § 110
(Michie Supp. 1963). The Institute's intent has been recognized in
litigation involving the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. A financing
statement describing the security as "television appliances and
other similar equipment" was held to include refrigerators, wash-
ers, a dryer, and a freezer. In the Matter of AA Appliance & TV
Center, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Wis. 1959). A federal case,
In the Matter of Drane, 202 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Ky. 1962), de-
cided under the Uniform Commercial Code, held: "A description
is sufficient if the facts shown will enable a third party, assisted
by external evidence to identify the property."
F, in the principal case, would have been protected had he filed
a financing statement perfecting his purchase money security in-
terest prior to the delivery of the chattel, or within ten days
thereafter. W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 9, § 301(2) (Michie Supp.
1963). A filing within the ten-day grace period will also cut off
intervening security interests of bulk purchasers and lien creditors.
Urxmo~mv CommERcIL CODE § 9-301, Comment 5.
Here, then, P held a "protected" security interest during the ten-
day grace period only, at the end of which his interest became
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subordinate to the D's interest arising from the after-acquired prop-
erty clause. The failure of D's financing statement to include the
after-acquired property clause was held immaterial as the financing
statement gave notice only that there might be a security interest.
Had D had actual notice of P's interest, the after-acquired property
clause would have been void as to P's interest. W. VA. CODE ch.
46, art 9, § 301(1)(b) (Michie Supp. 1963).
The notice filing system is a simplification of protective record-
ing statutes brought about by increased economic endeavor in the
field of credit purchases. Where formerly the security instrument
needed to be recorded in its entirety, now mere notice of its ex-
istence on a one-page financing statement will suffice. The require-
ments of the financing statement are typical of the simplicity
contemplated by the Uniform Commercial Code.
Charles Marion Love III
Wils-Devise of Specific Portion of Property
Held in Cotenancy
D's father attempted by codicil to devise to D a specific portion
or parcel of a tract held as cotenants by D's father and mother.
The residue of his estate was to go to his eight children, including
D. The surviving cotenant failed for seventeen years to object
to the purported devise, and at her death her one-half undivided
interest in the tract passed to the seven surviving children. To
P's action for sale and distribution D asserted the purported devise
from her father as a defense. The trial court ruled that D took
her father's one-half undivided interest in the portion purportedly
devised by the codicil. Held, reversed. The owner of an un-
divided interest in real property does not have the power to devise
a particular portion of the tract or his interest in that portion.
Mauzy v. Nelson, 131 S.E.2d 389 (W. Va. 1963).
In the principal case the court declared that the testator's pur-
ported devise to D "is void and can be given no effect." The ra-
tionale was that the mother's interest would have been prejudiced
had the codicil been effective. The testator, having attempted
to devise more than he owned, succeeded in devising nothing.
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